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This paper explores what factor is important to replicate U.S. fertility transition in the
last twocenturies. We solveamultiperiodversionofthemodelofKimuraandYasui(J Econ
Growth 15(4):323-351, 2010) numerically, conducting several experiments based on it. We
ﬁnd that the main trendof fertility transition in the last two centuries is attributedto changes
in gender division of laborassociated with capital accumulation and technological progress,
the plunge during 1920-1940 to negative shocks on male labor supply by the World War
II, and the upswing during 1940-1965 to an atypical burst of technological progress in
household sector.
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11 Introduction
Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many Western developed countries experienced
similar patterns of fertility transition. After the fall in fertility during the demographic transition,
there were some periods of unusual deviations in fertility around an otherwise declining trend.
There was ﬁrst a plunge of fertility rates during 1920-1940, followed by a sharp upswing during
1940-1965 (the baby boom). During the period 1965-1985, the fertility rate returned to even
lower levels than before the boom.
Recently, several researchers have attempted to identify the driving force behind the baby
bust of 1920-1940 and the baby boom of 1940-1965 in secularly declining trend. Greenwood et
al. (2005) attribute the secular decline in fertility and the temporary rise to increases in market-
sector productivity and household-sector productivity respectively. They argue that the rise in
household-sector productivity was spawned by the introduction of electricity and the develop-
ment of associated household products such as appliances and frozen foods. Tamura and Simon
(2010) identify declining young adult mortality and falling price for space as the causes of the
secular decline and the baby boom respectively. Doepke et al. (2007) attribute the baby boom to
the demand shock for female labor caused by World War II. They argue that women of the post-
war generation were crowded out of the labor market and chose to have more children, leading
to the baby boom.1
These studies share the common feature that unusual deviations in fertility around a secu-
lar declining trend were caused by exogenous shocks, e.g., exogenous technological changes,
the WWII. On the contrary, the model of Kimura and Yasui (2010) generates such a fertility
transition as a by-product of economic development associated with capital accumulation: the
gender time lag in participation in paid work resulting from capital accumulation leads to a
non-monotonic fertility dynamics.
Both the approach focusing on exogenous factors and the approach of Kimura and Yasui
1Various explanations on the baby have been proposed by many researchers. See, for instance, Kimura and Yasui
(2010), Doepke et al. (2007), and Greenwood et al. (2005), and the references therein.
2(2010) focusing on the endogenous driving force succeed in capturing the main features of U.S.
fertility transition: there was ﬁrst a plunge of fertility rates during 1920-1940, followed by a
sharp upswing during 1940-1965, and then the fertility rate returned to even lower levels than
before the boom. However, both of them fail to quantitatively replicate large swings in the
mid-twentieth century. It might be the case because the former is based on the model without
structural change accompanying economic growth and the latter does not consider exogenous
factors other than TFP growth.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce exogenous shocks into the model of Kimura and Yasui
(2010) and quantitatively assess the capability of the model to generate U.S. fertility transition in
the last two-centuries. Theoriginal model of Kimuraand Yasui (2010)isunsuitablefor consider-
ing exogenous shocks because it is a three-period overlapping-generations model and the length
of a period in the quantitative analysis is 20 years, which is too long to consider various shocks,
e.g., although we introduce the mobilization of male labor during the war as a war shock, the
period when massive wartime mobilization was observed in U.S. was not more than 10 years.2
We extend the three-period overlapping-generations model of Kimura and Yasui (2010) to the
multiperiod overlapping-generations model and simulate the model with exogenous shocks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a mul-
tiperiod version of the model of Kimura and Yasui (2010). Section 3 discusses our calibration
strategy and presents the results of quantitative analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
Consider an overlapping generations model in which agents live for TC+T periods: each agent
lives for TC periods as a child, for TA periods as an adult, and for TO periods as an elderly person,
that is, T = TA +TO. We assume that TC ≤ TA. In childhood, they do not make any decisions
and consume a ﬁxed quantity of time from their parents. In adulthood, they raise children,
2See Doepke et al. (2007) for details.
3supply labor to the market, engage in non-market work, and consume goods. In old age, they
only consume goods. All decisions are made at the beginning of adulthood (adult age 0). Then
agents decide the number of children, the amount of time spent on market and non-market work
in each period, and the consumption plan over their lifetime.
The economy is populated by two kinds of agents: men and women. Men and women differ
only in terms of their ability to earn wages in the labor market. It is assumed that there is no
difference between men and women in the abilities to do non-market work and raise children.
This assumption is employed for simpliﬁcation, not crucial for our main results. What matters is
that men have a comparative advantage in market work. The mechanism generating the gender
wage gap is identical to that of Galor and Weil (1996); men and women have equal endowments
of mental input, but men have more physical strength than women, and thus a gender wage gap
reﬂecting this difference in physical strength exists. A man and a woman form a family and
jointly decide the allocation of their time; they are assumed to have joint consumption and joint
utility. Our basic unit of analysis is the couple and they are assumed to be together from birth so
that we need not consider issues related to the formation of families.
2.1 Production
There is a single ﬁnal good, the numeraire, which can either be consumed or invested. The ﬁnal
goods can be produced in two sectors: the non-market sector, where the only input is labor, and
the market sector, which is relatively capital-intensive.
The production technology is the same as the one used in Kimura and Yasui (2010). The
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b> 0a n dα ∈(0,1) are parameters. It is important to note that physical capital and mental labor
4are more complementary than physical capital and physical labor.
Assuming perfectly competitive factor markets, the return on a unit of physical labor at time
t, w
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where δ ∈[0,1] is the depreciation rate of physical capital. If all the time available were devoted
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It follows from (2) and (3) that we can write the period-t interest rate as a function of the













where ht is the couple’s time input to non-market work.
2.2 Couples’ decision problem
Couples receive utility from the number of children that they have and from consumption stream





β jlnct,j +γlnnt (6)
5where ct,j is consumption at adult age j and nt is the number of children..
Each adult is endowed with a unit of time that can be devoted to market work, non-market









t,j denote the time spent on market work, non-market work, and child
rearing, respectively. The person indexed by the superscript H (resp. W) is the husband (resp.
wife). Raising a pair of children takes fraction z ∈ (0,1) of the time endowment of one person
in each period. The time constraint for raising children can be written as
qH
t,j +qW
t,j = znt for j ≤ TC−1.
Offsprings consume their parents’ time only in childhood.
The ﬂow budget constraint that the couple faces in period t + j is
ct,j +at,j+1 =( 1+rt+j)at,j +mt,j for j = 0,...,T −1, (7)
with at,0 = at,T = 0,
where at,j, rt+j and mt,j are their assets, the interest rate, and their earnings in period t + j,










The couple chooses how to allocate its time among different activities. The couple‘s division
of labor can be classiﬁed into four cases. Case 1: The couple spends no time on market work.
Case2: The wife spends no time on market work and the husband spends part of his time on
market work. Case 3: The husband specializes in market work and the wife spends no time on
6market work. Case 4: The husband specializes in market work and the wife also engages in
market work.
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Note that h and ¯ h denote the time spent on non-market work such that the marginal product of
non-market work is equal to the men’s wage rate, wm
t +w
p
t , and the women’s, wm
t , respectively.
In old age, the couple does not work:
mt,j = 0f o rj > TA−1.









where qt,j is the present-value price, which is deﬁned by qt,j = qt,j−1/(1+rt+j) with qt,0 = 1.









































for j = 1,...,T −1. (14)
3 Equilibrium
Let Nt denote the size of the cohort turning adult in period t. The market-clearing condition for
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t+j) if Case 2,







t+j) if Case 4.
(16)
The cohort size Nt evolves according to the law of motion:
Nt+TC = Ntnt.
Some initial conditions must be given for specifying the dynamics of this model. In period 0,
there are T generations of adults and elderly people. The initial demographic structure of adults
and elderly people is expressed by the T-dimensional vector (N−T+1,...,N−1,N0). Denote their
8initial assets by (a−T+1,T−1,...,a−2,2,a−1,1). Given these initial conditions, the initial aggregate






Furthermore, there are TC−1 generations of children, (n0N0,n−1N−1,...,n−TN).












t=1, (ii) the allocations {Kt,Lm
t }
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(iii) the market-clearing conditions hold.
4 The Difference Equation System
To simulate the model, take the length of a period in the model to be 10 years. For that purpose,
we consider the case of TC = 2, TA = 2, TO = 2.

















where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with this problem. The ﬁrst-order conditions
imply

























9As is apparent from (9), mt,j takes different forms in different cases. That the couple can
freely choose one of four cases at adult ages 0 and 1 makes the problem complex. There are 9
patterns in their case choice: (Case 2, Case 2), (Case 2, Case 3), ... , (Case 4, Case 3), and (Case
4, Case 4). Note that Case 1 dose not arise in equilibrium if capital stock is positive because the
aggregate production function meets the Inada condition.
For deriving the solution, we ﬁrst calculate the within-pattern maximized utility for 9 pat-









, which provides the couple
with maximal utility.
































for j = 1,2,3. (20)
The transformed period-t labor market clearing condition is
Lm
t = Ntlt,0+Nt−1lt−1,1. (21)











where kt ≡ Kt/Nt and θt ≡ Nt+1/Nt. Using (18) and (20), we see that period-t savings depend
on wt−3, wt−2, wt−1, wt, wt+1, wt+2,a n dθt.
10Using (2) and (15), we get
wm







From (19), we see that (23) depends on wt−1, wt, wt+1, wt+2, wt+3,a n dθt.
It follows from (22) and (23) that









From (20), we ﬁnd that RHS of this equation depends on wt−3, wt−2, wt−1, wt, wt+1, wt+2, wt+3,
and θt.
The cohort size Nt evolves according to the law of motion:
Nt+2 = Ntnt. (25)











Equations (24) and (26) together implicitly deﬁne a difference equation system:
D(wt−3,wt−2,...,wt+3,θt,θt+1)=0. (27)
This nonlinear difference equation system is used to compute the time path for fertility.
5 Simulation
Take the length of a period in the model to be 10 years so that an individual lives for 20 years as
a child, for 20 years as an adult, and for 20 years as an elderly person. There will be 17 model
11periods between 1830 and 2000.
Thus far we have not taken infant mortality into consideration, but it is not negligible for
simulating the model over long periods; infant mortality is much lower today than 200 years
ago. Although we do not explicitly model infant mortality, we assume that nt represents the
number of pairs of “surviving” children following the convention of literature. We use the total
fertility rate net of infant mortality as data compared with simulated fertility.3
5.1 Calibration
The model has two types of parameters. One is parameters constant over time: α (physical cap-
ital share), δ (depreciation rate of physical capital), β (subjective discount factor), b (Marginal
product of physical labor per TFP), and ξ (Curvature of non-market production function). The
other is time-varying parameters: zt (time cost of having a child), At (technological level in
market sector), and ηt (technological level in non-market sector).
We set α = 0.3 because it is well known that capital share of income is roughly 30%. Fol-
lowing Doepke et al. (2007) and Greenwood et al. (2005), we set the value of δ so that the
annual depreciation rate of physical capital is 4.7%, i.e., δ = 1−(1−0.047)
10. We set the
yearly discount rate to 3%, which implies β = 0.9710.
The remaining parameters are estimated based on historical evidence or chosen to match the
data.
Time paths for TFP in the market sector similar to those found in the United States between
1830 and 2000 are given to the model. The initial level of TFP is normalized to unity. The
estimates of the growth rates of TFP for 1830-1890 are taken from Gallman (2000, p.15, Table
1.4), those for 1890-1950 are from Carter et al., eds (2006, Series Cg270 and Cg278), and those
for 1950-2000 are from Bureau of Labor Statistics.4
It isdifﬁcultto specifytechnological progress inthe non-market sector {ηt}, because various
3Total fertility rates and infant mortality rates are taken from Haines (2008, Table 1).
4Source: ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/opt/mp/prod3.mfptablehis.zip
12factors have contributed to it. We use the growth rates of agricultural productivity as a proxy
of technological progress in the non-market sector. According to Atack et al. (2000, Table 6.I.),
the annual growth rate of agricultural productivity from 1800 and 1900 is 0.49%. Based on this
value. we set the time path of technological level in the non-market sector so that ηt+1/ηt =
(1+0.0049)
10.
Next, consider the sequence of the time cost of having a child, {zt}. Since we take the
length of a period in the model to be 10 years, age-0 children and age-1 children in the model
respectively correspond to children aged 0-9 and children aged 10-19 in the real world. In reality,
the cost parents with age-0 children bear differ from the cost parents with age-1 children bear.
For parents with age-0 children, spending on health, nutrition, and sanitation might account
for a substantial fraction of total cost of child-rearing. For parents with age-1 children, on the
contrary, education costs might take up a large portion in total spending on children. We assume
the time cost function incorporating such ideas. The time cost function for parents with age-0
children, i.e., age-0 adults, in periodt isgiven byCOSTt,0 =0.5·1/(1−IMRt)+0.5SERt,wh e r e
IMRt is the infant mortality rate and SERt is the school enrollment rate.5 The formulation of this
cost function reﬂects the idea that parents raising age-0 children principally bear health-related
costs in the ﬁrst half of the period and education-related costs in the second half. The time cost
function for parents with age-1 children, i.e., age-1 adults, in period t is given by COSTt,1 =
SERt. Note that we compute COSTt,i for i = 0,1 by a linear approximation because there are
some cohorts whose data are not available. Following the empirical results of Haveman and
Wolfe (1995) and Knowles (1999), we set z1990 = 0.4, that is, zt,i = z1990·COSTt,i/COST1990 for
i = 0,1.
Other parameters, γ, b, ξ,a n dη1800, are chosen to minimize the sum of squares of gap
between predicted fertility and actual fertility for appropriate parameter sets.
Following the procedures above, we obtain the parameter values listed in Table 1.
5The school enrollment rate of whites aged 5-19 for 1850-1990 are taken from Goldin (1999, CG.A.15).
13Table 1: Baseline parameter values
Parameter Interpretation Value
α Physical capital share 0.3
b Marginal product of physical labor per TFP 0.7
δ Depreciation rate of physical capital 1−(1−0.047)10
γ Weight of children in utility function 0.5
η1800 Efﬁciency of non-market production in 1800 4.9
ξ Curvature of non-market production function 0.39
5.2 Transitional Dynamics
Imagine starting the economy off in 1830, and suppose that it is a initial state belonging to Case
2. Figure 1 presents the simulations against the actual data.
We ﬁnd that the model does well at explaining the main trend in fertility transition (a long
secular decline, interrupted by a temporary rise), but fails to replicate a baby boom around 1960
and signiﬁcant declines before and after the boom. Furthermore, the model cannot explain sharp
rises of married-female participation in paid work in the latter half of the twentieth century,
which would be one of the factors preventing the model from replicating the baby bust after the
baby boom.
5.3 Experiments
We have simulated a multiperiod version of the model of Kimura and Yasui (2010). The simu-
lation not only captures the main trend in fertility transition (a long secular decline, interrupted
by a temporary rise) but also does better at replicating fertility transition than the simulation of
Kimura and Yasui (2010). As Kimura and Yasui (2010), however, there remains a considerable
discrepancy between fertility transition in the data and that in the model around the baby boom:
the amplitude of variations in simulated fertility is much smaller than that in observed fertility.
Now consider what caused such sharp rises and declines of fertility in the twentieth century.































Figure 1: Baseline case
5.3.1 Modeling the War Shock
We now want to demonstrate how a shock caused by the World War II affects fertility in our
model. We model the war shock as a one-time decline in the availability of male labor. Consider
a sudden drop in the availability of male labor from 1 to τ ∈ (0,1) in period tW. It is assumed
that this drop is unpredictable until the beginning of period tW. Basically, we concentrate on
the rational-expectation equilibrium where couples’ expectations about the future are realized,
but the unpredictability interrupts the rational expectation. Forward-looking couples make their
decisions anticipating the future sequences of factor prices, but the war shock forces couples to
rearrange their plan in period tW. Couples of age elderly 1 in period tW are affected by this shock
only through the change of the interest rate in that period: their age-elderly-1 consumption level,
ctW−3,3, differs from the initially planned level. However, nothing but ctW−3,3 changes for them
because their fertility, labor-supply, and saving behaviors have been already ﬁnished by then.

































Figure 2: Effect of war shock
Couples of age elderly 0 in period tW change their saving-consumption plan in response to the
changes of factor prices induced by the war shock: ctW−2,2 and ctW−2,3 differ from the initially
planned levels. Couples of age adult 1 in period tW change their time allocation between market
work and non-market work in period tW, {lH
tW−1,1,lW
tW−1,1}, and their consumption plan after
the shock, {ctW−1,1,ctW−1,2,ctW−1,3}. For couples of age adult 0, on the contrary, the initially
planned fertility, time allocation, and consumption are consistent with the realized ones because
they make their decisions after observing the war shock.
Figure 2 depicts the results. If, following Doepke et al. (2007), we assume that τ = 0.7, i.e.,
the amount of male labor available in period tW declines by 30%, then |n1940−n1930| = 0.0245,
which explains 27.4% of observed drop of net fertility from period 1930 to period 1940. To
replicate the observed drop, we need to set τ = 0.34. We can ﬁnd that the introduction of the
war shock improves the simulation result, but only slightly.
165.3.2 The time cost of having a child
For the baseline, we considered the case where the time cost of having a child increased because
of exogenous increases in education costs. However, there are many other factors reducing the
time cost, for instance, the prevalence of appliances and frozen foods and the higher availability
of child-care services. Greenwood et al. (2005) argue that an atypical burst of technological
progress in household sector occurred in the middle of the last century, which lowered the cost
of having children. In our model, such technological progress means declines in the cost of
having child-0 children.
As an experiment, here, we incorporate changes in the time cost of having a child similar to
those considered in Greenwood et al. (2005). We set the time cost of having a child in period
1950 and 1960 so that z1950,0/z1940,0 and z1956,0/z1940,0 are equal to the corresponding ratios in
the model of Greenwood et al. (2005). Fig. 3 shows that reducing the cost of having a child, zt,0,
in those periods generates a larger scale of baby boom and makes the simulated fertility rates
closer to the observed ones. During the baby-bust period, however, the gap between predicted
fertility and actual fertility becomes larger than that in the baseline case.
5.3.3 The technology of non-market production
Thus far, we have incorporated a war shock and changes in child-rearing costs into the model
for generating large variations in fertility around the baby boom. From the experiments, we can
infer what is behind large swings of fertility in the middle of the twentieth century. In our model,
the size and the timing of the baby boom crucially depend on the sequence of the technology
level of non-market production.
In the baseline case, we set ηt+1/ηt =( 1+0.0049)
10. Suppose that the value is changed to
(1+0.0059)
10 and (1+0.0039)
10. Figure 4 depicts the results. The timing of the baby boom
depends on the growth rate of the efﬁciency of non-market production. The rapid technological
progress in the non-market sector inhibits the shift of labor from the non-market sector to the
market sector and retards the advent of baby boom.

































Figure 3: Effect of change of child-rearing cost.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Our objective in this chapter was to explore what factor is important to replicate U.S. fertility
transition in the last two centuries. We solved a multiperiod version of the model of Kimura and
Yasui (2010) numerically, conducting several experiments based on it. We found that the main
trend of fertility transition in the last two centuries is attributed to changes in gender division of
labor associated with capital accumulation and technological progress, the plunge during 1920-
1940 to negative shockson male laborsupply by the World War II, and the upswing during1940-
1965 to an atypical burst of technological progress in household sector. It remains, however,
difﬁcult to replicate large variations in fertility around the baby boom.
We conclude by suggesting some potential directions for future research. First, introducing
human capital investments in children could produce larger swings in fertility. In this chapter,
we assume that males and females differ only in their innate ability to earn wages in the mar-

































Figure 4: Effect of change of technological progress in the non-market production.
ket sector. Educational investments by parents after birth might magnify or diminish the innate
difference, and thus could amplify time-series variation in fertility. Second, our model employs
some assumptions for simpliﬁcation, such as log-linear utility function and perfect substitutabil-
ity between the goods produced in market sector and non-market sector. The relaxation of these
assumptions might improve our simulation results.
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